New labour codes namely Code of Social Security, 2020; The OSH Code, 2020; Code of Wages, 2019; and IR Code, 2020, are enacted and consolidated 29 central laws, with the aim of unification, simplification and to promote ease of doing business, which was also the recommendation of 2nd labour commission in 2002. Pre-labour law such as Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (hereinafter as, IDA) operated on the premise of acknowledging the inherent inequality between capital and labour. A granular analysis of new labour codes shows that the new labour codes deepens the power asymmetry in favour of employers in the guise of ease of doing business, now these codes are got stuck between bargaining power and formal rights as the codes enhances the bargaining power of worker by officially ending the voluntary era of trade union, and by providing them recognition under the IRC by mandating it to be recognized by employers. On the other side at the same time dilutes the statutory rights of workers such as by making it mandatory to give 14-day advance notice of strike, a requirement which was earlier mandatory for only to public utility services. As the German Federal Court in its judgement in 1980 noted that collective bargaining without the right to strike is merely collective begging.

New Labour Codes

• Recognition of Collective Bargaining

IRC has finally ended the voluntary based era and makes mandatory recognition of trade unions.  Chapter III of IRC mandates that every industrial establishment to have one negotiating union or negotiating council to deal with the employer. Section 14 of IRC provides that if there is only one registered union exist in an establishment then the employer must recognize that union as the sole negotiating union. If multiple registered union exist, then the one with support of 51% workers on muster roll in an establishment will be recognised by the employer as the sole negotiating union. In case where no registered union have support of 51% workers on muster roll, then negotiating council will be constituted and for which one representative from every union who have support of 20% workers, and the representation will be one representative for every 20% support. These statutory provisions are designed to strengthen collective bargaining, and even the Government FAQs stressed that “trade unions get statutory backing in the form of negotiating union/negotiating council under the code thereby strengthening their collective bargaining,” and further clarifies the intent of legislature.

• Dilution of Statutory Rights

Importantly, IRC crucially added restriction to the strike, Section 62(1)(b) of IRC now requires a 14-day advance notice for strike in any sector, which was only mandatory for public utility under section 22 of IDA, further, the advance notice will remain valid for 60 days. The IRC also bans strike during the conciliation period and seven days thereafter, and also during and 60 days post-tribunal proceedings ended. Although this was done even after the recommendation of the parliament standing committee to retain the old provision while the committee specifically noted that “the restriction should not apply to all strikes and demonstration.” However, in the FAQs the government also clarified that the IRC does not banning the strike but only regulating it. But in practice this regulation is not less than curtailment of the rights of workers.

Bargaining Power v. Legal Protection

Now the question comes, do the recognition could compensate for stricter strike constraint? The Answer is definitely a big no. The statutory recognition has just only provided a bargaining status and also comes with some very heavy caveats. The first one is that the only large union will be able in the negotiation space as the threshold is high because of which small union specifically with less support will not have any say in bargaining process and remain excluded. Second, even the recognised unions will have to face certain difficulties as they will only be able. To negotiate and cannot legally strike except with very stricter condition to enforce their demands. While in the United Kingdom the prior 2025, the Trade union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 was requires only 10% membership with majority favors it in a secret ballot for support for negotiating pay, hours, and holidays which was further changes by Employment Rights Act, 2025 which strengthen the rights of worker by lowering the threshold to 2-10% without mandatory ballots if over 50% membership. If we compare that with India, then here the threshold is way too high, and there is no ballot mechanism. The 51% threshold will also impact minority union which will not get the space for negotiation, this lack of plurality of voices and their representation will going to impact the livelihood and grievances of the remaining 49%.  Generally, a union start with small base and with time they build their reputation by constantly intervening and raising the issues of workers, but the threshold could become as bar to the growth of new unions.

Albeit the IRC retain the provision of right to strike but it is no longer than same as before and it has become even weaker. The Supreme Court inT.K. Rangarajan v. Government of Tamil Nadu (2003) held that there is no fundamental right to strike, and forming a union under Article 19(1)(c) did not guarantee effective bargaining strike power. Prior to this in Kameshwar Prasad v. State of Bihar (1962), the Supreme Court clarified that freedom of association is protected but strike impacting essential services lacks constitutional sanctity. Further under Section 55 of IRC replicates the executive power which could undercut collective bargaining outcomes, the code authorizes the government to both defer and modify tribunal awards in broad circumstances. These powers are same as Section 17A of IDA which was declared unconstitutional by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Telugunadu Workcharged Employees State Federation, Nalgonda District Unit President v. Government of India (1997), and multiple High Court thereafterbecause they were curtailing the separation of powers, still they retained in new code which means even after a settlement state could intervene to it if it wants.

Conclusion

The Industrial Relations Code, 2020 presents a fundamental paradox as it gives formal recognition to bargaining power while systematically weakening it substantially which left recognition mere symbolically as the extension to advance notice to all sectors, prolonged cooling-off periods, and the high 51% threshold will neutralize the collective action and reduces it to mere collective begging. With this the retention of Section 55 IRC relates to executive overreach despite heretofore judicial precedents declaring such provisions as unconstitutional exposes codes intent and its tilt towards employers. Long story short the IRC deepens the power asymmetry by granting workers formal seats in negotiating table while denying the real rights to bargain effectively.