Can the law sustain the existence of an ‘offence’ where the ‘victim’, as statutorily defined, disclaims any loss or injury? This question lies at the heart of the evolving jurisprudence on the quashing of criminal proceedings under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. The Delhi High Court has recently laid down various principles governing the quashing of cases registered under the POCSO Act where the de jure victim denies having suffered any actual harm. The POCSO Act, 2012 is a landmark legislation in India aimed at safeguarding children from sexual abuse and exploitation, premised on a strict liability framework that renders the consent of a minor legally irrelevant. However, the Delhi High Court, in Harmeet Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi), explicitly acknowledges the tension inherent in cases where the mere establishment of age and the occurrence of the proscribed act is sufficient to attract criminal liability, observing a disconnect between a rigid legal construct and the human lives it seeks to govern.

Factual And Procedural Background

The petition was filed in accordance with Article 226 of the Constitution along with Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, for the quashing of FIR No. 279/2025 filed on 13 June 2025 under Sections 64(1) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 and Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012.

The prosecutrix was about 17 years old when the relationship began and the accused was 22 years old. The two got married in the year 2024 and gave birth to their child in 2025. It is pertinent to mention here that the prosecutrix did not file any complaint against the accused. In fact, the FIR was registered after notification by medical officials where the prosecutrix went to deliver her baby in accordance with Section 19 of the POCSO Act.

The accused had made a plea for quashing the FIR. The prosecutrix filed her affidavit claiming that she had gotten married on her own free will and had no complaint against the accused. She even said that if the case continued against him, it would mean serious repercussions for her as well as her child because he was her sole source of support[i].

Court’s Observation

The court therefore identified the following complex legal dilemmas:

1. Can there be an offence if no loss or injury has been claimed to have been suffered by a victim, as statutorily defined?

2. Should a penal provision be so applied that it results in grave consequences on the de-jure victim?

The court reiterated that currently under POCSO Act, read with the then prevailing provisions of the IPC, any sexual act with a person under 18 is criminalised per se, without importing “consent” as a constituent element once the victim is a child[ii]. The statute defines the “child” as any person below the age of eighteen years[iii].

A child as a victim is therefore at the centre of the scheme and purpose of the POCSO Act. However, the POCSO Act does not define a victim in the statute. Instead, it relies upon definitions contained in other statutes which require that a victim must have suffered loss or injury caused by the act of the accused.[iv] However, this general understanding of victimhood does not strictly apply to POCSO, which presumes harm based on age, this divergence is what creates interpretive difficulty.

Given this, as harm is presumed in adolescent cases and need not be further proved, it may create difficulty in cases where a person herself/himself resists the label of victimhood. When viewed against contemporary Indian realities, this rigid approach raises important concerns. Accordingly, the statutory framework under POCSO appears too narrow and requires broader interpretation.

Thus, the understanding of victimhood under POCSO, which draws upon definitions such as those under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, therefore warrants reconsideration. Rather than relying upon a uniform statutory assumption, a more nuanced understanding of victimhood should evolve under POCSO, taking into consideration, factors such as lived realities and the best interests of the victim.

The Court, therefore, in the present case, emphasises the need to distinguish between a de jure victim, recognised by operation of law, and a de facto victim, whose experience reflects actual harm or injury.

De Jure Victims And De Facto Victimhood

In the present case, Justice Anup Jairam Bhambhani observed that in many POCSO cases, there might be a de jure victim, a victim as formally recognised by law, but not a de facto or actual victim who has suffered any harm or loss.

The court stated that in cases such as the one involving the petition can be described as a “crime without a victim”, Even where neither party experiences harm in any ordinary sense, and no complaint is forthcoming, the legal framework operates on a normative assumption that harm inheres in the act by reason of minority. Yet, where no one experiences a setback to their interests, the idea of harm becomes questionable[v].

In the present case the minor girl is constructed as a victim not because of any demonstrable harm that she may have endured, but because the statutory framework denies her capacity for valid consent. The court cautions against pedantic enforcement of statutory provisions where such enforcement disregards lived realities, results in re-victimisation, and produces outcomes detrimental to the person sought to be protected. The court stated that-

 “A strict textual approach to the law, when deployed in cases such as the present one, in effect, prioritises a protective, statute- based understanding of harm over lived reality, thereby collapsing the distinction between actual victimhood and presumed vulnerability. The result is a peculiar scenario where the victim neither claims nor experiences harm, yet the legal framework insists on her victimhood, and the offender-status of the accused”

Against this backdrop, the Court observed that a significant number of cases exist over “consensual” relationships between a minor close to attaining 18 years and an adult who is not much older than them. Often, such relationships culminate in marriage and children. Recognizing this reality, the Court held that when a de jure victim consents to quashing a POCSO case against an accused, the court must record its satisfaction on certain grounds.

Guidelines For Quashing Of FIR

The Court stressed that justice cannot ignore lived realities and that continuing prosecution in such cases may amount to an exercise in “futility”, especially where it risks leaving both the woman and her child without support.

The court was of the view, that when examining a plea for quashing of an offence under the POCSO Act based on the consent of a de-jure victim, the court must carefully evaluate the reasons as to why the victim disclaims any loss or injury to her and record its satisfaction inter alia on the following aspects-

1. The court must be satisfied that in granting a  no-objection to the quashing of criminal proceedings, the de-jure victim is genuinely acting of her own free will and volition and has not been misled, pressured or deceived into offering such no-objection;
2. Whether the de-jure victim has taken a consistent stand in favour of closing the case from the inception of the criminal proceedings, and has disclaimed having suffered any loss or injury at the hands of the offender;
3. Whether the circumstances of the case justify an inference that the acts or omissions were volitional on the part of the de-jure victim;
4. Whether the marriage or other arrangement, based on which the offender and the de-jure victim are seeking closure of criminal proceedings, evokes confidence on the part of the court; or does it appear to be a ruse or stratagem of the offender to evade conviction and punishment
5. Whether the parties have been living together as a family for a length of time; and whether children are born to the parties, whose future would also be impacted by a decision not to quash the criminal proceedings;
6. Whether the offender is alleged to have committed any violence or brutality on the de-jure victim; or has committed any other act or omission that points to the absence of genuine volition on the part of the de-jure victim; and if so, is there any medical and other forensic evidence to show such conduct on the offenders part;
7. What was the respective age of the offender and the de-jure victim at the relevant time; whether both were minor; and what are the ramifications of the relative age difference and minority.

The Court clarified that the Court must interact with the parties and satisfied that such quashing is warranted to secure the ends of justice and prevent abuse of process. Ultimately, the decision must be guided by the best interests of the de jure victim and any child born from the relationship[vi].

Application To Present Case

On the basis of the above-mentioned aspects, it was observed by the Court that prosecutrix’s age was roughly 17 years at the relevant point of time and that of the petitioner was around 22 years. The FIR was not lodged by prosecutrix herself rather it was registered at the instance of hospital authorities upon her visit for childbirth. It may be noted that from the very beginning, prosecutrix had never preferred any charge against the petitioner rather she got herself married to the petitioner and now living happily with the petitioner along with their child. No allegation of any kind of harassment or violence was ever made by the prosecutrix against the petitioner. On the other hand, prosecutrix used to give voluntarily her opinion for quashing the said case as its continuance was likely to affect the interest of her family.

Thus, in view of above facts and circumstances, the court felt that further continuance of the matter would cause heavy harm for the prosecutrix and her minor child and will not bring about justice to anybody.

Need For A “Romeo–Juliet” Exception In Indian Law

The term “Romeo-Juliet clause” refers to a specific legal exemption that shields consensual sexual activity between minors (or between a minor and a slightly older person) from criminal prosecution provided certain age gap criteria are met. The name is derived from the famous teenage couple, Romeo and Juliet, created by Shakespeare, and used in many countries, including the United States, Canada, and some parts of Europe, to ensure that consensual sex among adolescents is not considered statutory rape.

According to a Romeo-Juliet clause, any consensual sex act between adolescents with a slight age difference (for instance, where the age difference is within 2-5 years) cannot be charged with statutory rape. The clause does not reduce sexual exploitation or sexual abuse of minors. It only separates sexual exploitation from consensual sexual acts between adolescents whose ages are close. In essence, the provision helps to protect adolescents against the misuse of the statutory rape laws in targeting natural adolescent sexual behaviour. Additionally, it also addresses cases in which parents report consensual sex acts involving their adolescents to the police due to dissatisfaction with their adolescents’ choices.

The Indian context clearly highlights the need for such a distinction. An analysis by NGO Enfold India of POCSO cases from Assam, Maharashtra and West Bengal revealed that 24.3% of all cases were ‘romantic’ in nature, involving consenting adolescents, while 80.2% were lodged by the girl’s parents, when she pursued a relationship against their will. In such cases, allegations of statutory rape are often levelled against the boy, while the girl is treated as a victim incapable of giving consent, thereby denying the sexual autonomy of both.

Judicial trends have also begun to acknowledge this reality. Courts have alluded to the “biosocial dynamics” of young adult relationships in observing the need for a more flexible law on the age of consent.[vii]However, in its 283rd Report, the Law Commission of India categorically ruled out any possibility of lowering the age of consent to 16 years, even while acknowledging that the present framework may lead to injustice in such cases.[viii] This reflects an ongoing tension between legislative rigidity and judicial attempts to respond to lived realities.

In this backdrop, the Supreme Court, in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Anurudh & Anr.,[ix] took note of the growing misuse of the POCSO Act in cases of consensual adolescent relationships and urged the Union Government to consider introducing a Romeo–Juliet clause. The Court directed that its judgment be circulated to the Secretary, Law, Government of India, for consideration of possible steps to curb misuse of the POCSO Act, including such an amendment.

From this perspective, the addition of the narrowly framed close-age gap exception to the law would not weaken the intent behind POCSO but rather enhance its scope through a clear differentiation of sexual abuse from autonomy. Such a reform would enable the law to better reflect contemporary social realities and prevent over-criminalisation, while continuing to uphold its core objective of protecting children.

Conclusion

The Delhi High Court, in Harmeet Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi), presents a practical and flexible interpretation of the strict provisions of the POCSO Act. By drawing a critical distinction between de jure and de facto victimhood, and by emphasising the need to prevent re-victimisation, the Court adopts a more context-sensitive approach. The guidelines ensure that the quashing of POCSO proceedings is not undertaken mechanically, but is instead guided by a careful assessment of the voluntariness of the prosecutrix’s stance, the absence of coercion, and the overarching interests of justice. Ultimately, the decision to quash criminal proceedings under the POCSO Act must be founded on the best interests of the de jure victim and the children, if any, born from the union of the parties.

However, courts must remain vigilant against offenders who may employ deceit, stratagem or dishonest devices to secure the quashing of criminal proceedings in their favour. In particular, it is necessary to install strong guardrails and parameters for consent, for quashing of criminal proceedings concerning offences under the POCSO Act. In such cases, Courts must be satisfied that in granting a no objection to the quashing of criminal proceedings, the de jure victim is genuinely acting on her own free will.

It is to be noted that the principal duty of a court is to do justice; and if unleashing the letter of the law leads to manifest injustice, a court cannot look the other way. At the same time, it cannot lose sight of the grave consequences that would befall a victim in a case like the present one. The court cannot ignore the fact that two lives i.e., of the de jure victim and her minor child, would be completely destroyed if the criminal proceedings against the petitioner are not quashed. In such circumstances, the continuation of criminal proceedings may become oppressive and amount to an abuse of the process of law. The law must, therefore, evolve in a manner that safeguards minors while remaining sensitive to the complexities of human relationships, ensuring that justice is both principled and humane.

[i] Harmeet Singh v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Anr., W.P. (Crl.) 1985/2025, decided on 16 April 2026 (Del HC), paras 2–4.7.

[ii] Independent Thought v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 800.

[iii] Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, s. 2(d)

[iv] Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, s. 2(1)(x).

[v] Joel Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, Vol. 4 (Oxford University Press)

[vi] Harmeet Singh v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Anr., W.P. (Crl.) 1985/2025, decided on 16 April 2026 (Del HC), para 36.

[vii] Vijayalakshmi v. State, 2021 SCC OnLine Mad 317.

[viii] Law Commission of India, Age of Consent under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, Report No. 283 (2017).

[ix] State of U.P. v. Anurudh & Anr., 2026 SCC OnLine SC 40.