The Indian Supreme Court has recently made two important rulings, K. Umadevi v. Government of Tamil Nadu^[i] and Dr. Kavita Yadav v. The State^[ii]. These decisions have significantly changed the legal framework regarding reproductive rights and maternity benefits in India. Instead of focusing only on employment, these rulings place maternity rights within a wider constitutional context. They confirm that these rights are not just privileges; they are essential to a woman’s right to life and dignity under Article 21 of the Constitution.

K. Umadevi Reclaiming Maternity Benefits and Challenging the “Two-Child Norm”

This is the story of Umadevi. She was an English teacher, hard-working and dedicated to her job in a government higher secondary school. Life had not been easy for her, she had two children from first marriage, but that marriage ended in a divorce, to make things worse for her, the children stayed with their father. Later, she got married and conceived from her second marriage and applied for maternity benefit for which the institution denied stating that the benefits can only be availed by those State Government female employees who have less than two surviving children. As per Fundamental Rule (FR) 101(a) applicable on Uma she cannot avail the benefits for the third biological child she was going to have. According to the State she was ineligible for benefits for a third child, regardless of custody arrangements or changed circumstances. She has reached the “limits” and her reproductive rights and benefits have expired.

Uma Devi’s petition was initially allowed by a Single Judge of the Madras High Court, who directed the State to grant her one year of maternity leave. However, the Division Bench of the High Court reversed this decision, holding that maternity leave was not a fundamental right and that service rules would prevail over the provisions of the Maternity Benefit Act.

Supreme Court’s interpretation of Article 21

The appeal went to the Supreme Court, which pointed out that reproductive rights are now recognized in different areas of international human rights law. These include the right to health, privacy, equality, non-discrimination, and dignity. Article 21 of the Constitution of India, though at first glance appears to be a colourless provision, is in fact a potent article with wide scope, it means to have a life in its fullest sense. It encompasses all aspects which make life meaningful and worth living. Reproductive rights including access to maternity benefits are thus part of the right to life under Article 21.

Further elaborating it the Supreme Court expanded the meaning of reproductive rights under Article 21. It clarified that reproductive rights are not confined to the choice of having or not having children. Instead, It also includes the constellation of freedoms and entitlements that empowers a woman to decide freely on all matters relating to her sexual and reproductive health.

The Maternity Benefit Act, 1961,^[iii] designed to provide economic security and health protection to working mothers. Section 5 of the Act deals with the right to payment of maternity benefits. It states that every woman shall be entitled to maternity benefit and shall be paid at the rate of average daily wage for the period of her actual absence. The qualifying conditions for the benefit state that a woman must have worked for at least 80 days in the 12 months before the expected date of delivery. Section 5(3), amended by the Maternity Benefit (Amendment) Act, 2017,^[iv] provides for 26 weeks of maternity leave for women who have fewer than two surviving children. For those having two or more surviving children, the leave period is 12 weeks. The Act does not impose an absolute bar on maternity benefits based on the number of children. It only differentiates the duration of leave. The Supreme Court interpreted this to mean that service rules like FR 101(a), which impose a blanket restriction, cannot override the Act. Further, under Section 27 of the Act, the provisions of the Maternity Benefit Act have an overriding effect over any inconsistent state service rule which aligns with Article 254 of the Constitution, which invalidates state laws to the extent they are inconsistent with central laws.

The Court clarified that Uma Devi’s two children from her first marriage were not in her custody, and her third child was the first-born post-entry into government service. Therefore, the application of the two-child norm under FR 101(a) was not valid in her case. The Court

implicitly accepted that “surviving children” must consider custodial status and the context of the child’s birth during employment. Rather than creating an either-or scenario between population control policies and maternity benefits, the Court emphasized the need for “purposive and rational” harmonization of these objectives.

The classification of women workers based on contractual workers historically excluded a vast number of women in the unorganized and contractual sectors from accessing maternity benefits. This exclusion perpetuates class-based injustice. The Supreme Court in K. Umadevi recognized that such classifications can result in structural discrimination. The Court recognized that

reproductive rights are not just legal privileges. They are essential to the right to life and dignity under Article 21. Article 14 establishes that the right to equality requires laws to avoid arbitrary classifications. These classifications should also have a logical connection to their intended goals. When maternity benefit eligibility is based only on job type or the number of children, without accounting for individual situations, it does not meet the reasonableness standard. By referencing Article 14, the Court stressed the importance of achieving real equality. This means not only treating everyone the same but also ensuring fair results, particularly for women who

face additional challenges due to their socio-economic status.

Dr. Kavita Yadav Extending Protections to Contractual Workers

Another story involves Dr. Kavita Yadav. She was a contractual pathology doctor at Janakpuri Hospital in Delhi. She was denied maternity benefits after her three-year contract ended. Despite applying for maternity leave under Section 5 of the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961, the benefits were curtailed after 11th June on the ground that her contract ended on that date. The Supreme Court, in a landmark holding, rejected this narrow interpretation. It held that maternity benefits cannot be curtailed merely because the contract period expires.

The Court relied on Section 12(2)(a) of the Maternity Benefit Act, which provides protection to women dismissed or discharged during pregnancy. This shows legislative intent to protect maternity benefits beyond the duration of active service. Further, fulfilment of conditions under Section 5 of the Act triggers the entitlement to medical and maternity benefits. The Court held that once these rights accrue, they are not extinguished merely because the employment period ends. The benefits travel beyond the contract term. The Court reaffirmed that Section 27

overrides any inconsistent agreement or contract, including fixed-term contracts, ensuring that statutory maternity benefits are not defeated by contractual clauses. Through this decision, the Court significantly expanded the protection of reproductive rights to contractual workers, marking a progressive step in ensuring constitutional parity.

Umadevi and Kavita Yadav judgments indicate a change from a limited view of maternity benefits tied to employment to a wider focus on constitutional rights. These rulings highlight that maternity benefits do not rely on tenure or contract status; instead, they arise from a woman’s natural reproductive autonomy and her constitutional rights. This jurisprudence paves the way for a more inclusive maternity benefit regime that addresses class-based exclusions, acknowledges women lived realities, and advances gender justice under the Indian Constitution. These decisions move beyond mere statutory compliance and locate maternity entitlements within the constitutional framework, particularly Articles 14, 15, and 21.

A step forward with unaddressed gaps

While it should be acknowledged that the Court rightly granted Uma Devi maternity leave, it on an unfortunate note stopped short of addressing the broader structural problem that caused the denial in the first place. The rule that denied her benefit, which was the ‘Tamil Nadu state FR 101(a)’, was left untouched, meaning other women in similar situations might still face rejection unless they, too, go to court.

The ruling helped Uma Devi personally but didn’t seem to see all the other Umadevis still struggling for their rights out there, so ultimately the system remained the same.

The judgment mentioned that Uma Devi “did not have custody of her first two children from her previous marriage,” which worked in her favour. But it did not clearly define what “surviving children” means under service rules. Is it based on biological relation, custody, or responsibility? Without clarification, the SC has created a loophole where vagueness prevails as the term is still open to interpretation, and future decisions might be inconsistent or unfair

A significant shortcoming of the judgment lies in its lack of clarity on the regularisation of the leave already availed by Uma Devi. While para 37 directs that the appellant “shall be granted maternity leave under FR 101(a)” and that “maternity benefits which are admissible… shall be released… within a period of two months,” the Court stops short of expressly stating whether her earlier leave period will be treated as maternity leave with pay.

This omission unfortunately creates ambiguity for implementation, since without an explicit directive on salary adjustment, service continuity, and related benefits, the authorities may be left uncertain about the scope of compliance. In effect, the Court’s broad declaration is commendable for recognising the right, but the absence of precise instructions risks diluting its practical enforceability.

The Court acknowledged the importance of the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 and even referred to its provisions for guidance. But it stopped short of stating that state service rules should align with this central legislation. Without that push, state governments may continue enforcing inconsistent or restrictive policies, limiting maternity entitlements depending on where a woman works.

Even though this case involved a formal government employee, the issue raised is relevant to millions of informal and contract-based women workers who don’t enjoy maternity benefits at all. The Court, despite having had the opportunity to speak more broadly about maternity protections across employment sectors chose rather to stay narrowly focused on the appellant’s status.

In the final assessment, the ruling could have paid more attention to the social realities and gender dynamics at play. Uma Devi’s circumstances were more complex than the law’s barebones interpretation; they included her identity as a remarried, childless woman who occupied a subordinate position within the administrative frameworks of society. Still, the Court did not consider these factors, nor did they view them as the sociopolitical constraints that most women in her situation would encounter.

^[i] Umadevi v. Government of Tamil Nadu & Ors., (2025) INSC 781

^[ii] Dr Kavita Yadav v. The Secretary, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare Department & Ors., (2024) 1 SCC 421

^[iii] Maternity Benefit Act, No. 53, Acts of Parliament, 1961 (India).

^[iv] Maternity Benefit (Amendment) Act, No. 6, Acts of Parliament, 2017 (India).