“The owner of a thing is owner of the fruits of that thing. Thus, the owner of a fruit tree will generally own the fruit produced by that tree.”

This proposition seems natural and intuitive when applied to tangible property. But what happens in the case when the “thing” is an artificial intelligence system, and the “fruit” is an original work generated by it? Can an AI system be recognized as the “author” of an original work under the Copyright Act, 1957[i], where the work was generated autonomously by the AI after being configured and trained through visual and linguistic inputs by a human, or must the law continue to attribute authorship to a legally recognized person?

This question lies at the heart of the case involving US AI researcher Stephen Thaler, who sought copyright for an artwork- ‘A Recent Entrance to Paradise’ created by his AI system “DABUS”. Thaler, through his lawyer Ankit Sahni, argued DABUS to be attributed as the sole author since the “final form, composition and expression of the artwork were created by DABUS itself”.

However, when the issue came before the Indian Copyright Office, it drew a crucial distinction between the originality of the output and the legal identity of its author. India’s DABUS ruling, therefore, takes the debate beyond the question of whether AI can “create”. It asks how copyright law should attribute authorship and ownership when the immediate act of generating a work is performed autonomously by a machine.

DABUS Before the UK Courts: Inventorship and Ownership

Thaler had filed two patent applications, but one unusual feature about these applications was that neither of the applications designated a human inventor, and no separate document identifying one was filed. Instead, the request for grant forms expressly stated that Thaler was not the inventor of the inventions described in the applications[ii].

The UK Intellectual Property Office (UKIPO) therefore required Thaler to file statements of inventorship identifying the person or persons whom he believed to be the inventor and, since he maintained that he was not the inventor, to indicate how he had derived his right to be granted the patents for which he was applying. Under Section 13[iii] of the Patents Act 1977 and Rule 10(3)[iv] of the Patent Rules 2007, these statements had to be filed within 16 months of the filing date.

Thaler responded by maintaining that the inventions had been created by DABUS acting autonomously. He asserted that he had acquired the right to be granted the patents because he owned DABUS. When the UKIPO informed him that he had not complied with the requirements of the 1977 Act, he reiterated that the inventions were “entirely and solely conceived by DABUS” and that DABUS therefore had to be named as inventor.

The hearing officer rejected this position. DABUS was not a person within the meaning of Sections 7[v] and 13 of the 1977 Act and therefore could not be qualified as an inventor. The hearing officer further held that DABUS had no rights that could be transferred and, in any event, no power to transfer anything it might have owned. Further, Dr Thaler was not entitled to a patent merely because he owned DABUS. Since he had failed to provide the information required under Section 13, the applications were to be treated as withdrawn upon expiry of the prescribed 16-month period.

The matter reached the UK Supreme Court. The Court framed the appeal around three questions: first, the scope and meaning of “inventor” under the 1977 Act; second, whether Thaler was nevertheless the owner of any invention made by DABUS and therefore entitled to apply for a patent; and third, whether the hearing officer was entitled to treat the applications as withdrawn for failure to comply with Section 13.

On the first issue, the SC held that an “inventor” within the meaning of the 1977 Act must be a natural person, and DABUS is not a person at all, let alone a natural person[vi]. Section 7(3)[vii] defined the inventor as the “actual deviser” of the invention, and the Court found that the statute, read as a whole, left no other interpretation.

Thaler relied on Section 7(2)(b)[viii], arguing that he was entitled to the property in the inventions by virtue of his ownership of DABUS. He relied on the doctrine of accession- the proposition that the owner of a thing may own the fruits produced by that thing. The Supreme Court rejected this argument. It held that accession deals with new tangible property produced by existing tangible property, whereas the alleged DABUS inventions were intangible concepts and methods. There was therefore no principled basis for applying accession so as to confer on Thaler ownership of, or a right to obtain a patent for, an invention autonomously generated by DABUS.

Finally, the Supreme Court upheld the consequence under Section 13. Thaler had failed to identify any person whom he believed to be the inventor and had failed to indicate a legally valid derivation of his right to the patents. His assertion that he owned DABUS was insufficient. The applications were therefore properly treated as withdrawn.

DABUS Before The Indian Copyright Office: Originality, Authorship and Ownership

The Indian Copyright Office’s analysis proceeded on a distinction between originality, authorship and ownership. This distinction is important because the Registrar of Copyright, Prof (Dr) Unnat Pandit, did not treat the fact of AI generation as sufficient, by itself, to deny copyright protection.

The first question was whether A Recent Entrance to Paradise satisfied the requirement of originality under Section 13(1)(a)[ix] of the Copyright Act, 1957. Since the Act does not define “original”, the Copyright Office considered the principles in University of London Press Ltd. v. University Tutorial Press Ltd.[x] and Eastern Book Co. v. D.B. Modak[xi]. The latter requires a “minimal degree of creativity”, rather than novelty or inventive ingenuity. On this basis, the Office found that the artwork contained a particular arrangement of visual forms, colours, tonal variations and spatial relationships[xii], and that it had not been shown to reproduce any identified pre-existing work.

Significantly, the Office did not regard algorithmic generation as synonymous with lack of originality. It examined the process through which the particular composition emerged and concluded that the final configuration was not shown to be a predetermined reproduction of material in the training inputs. It therefore held that the work crossed the limited threshold of originality under Section 13[xiii]. The finding was expressly confined to the material disclosed in the registration proceedings.

The more difficult question arose under Section 2(d)(vi)[xiv], which states that the author is “the person who causes the work to be created.” The Copyright Office treated this as a statutory rule of attribution, rather than as a reference to the entity that performs the final computational act. The inquiry, therefore, was one of legally attributable causation and had to be undertaken with respect to the particular work.

On the facts disclosed by the applicant, the Registrar found that Thaler had conceived and created DABUS, configured its operation, supplied the visual inputs, curated the linguistic inputs and initiated the process through which the particular artwork came into existence. DABUS performed the immediate computational generation, but operated within the architecture, objectives, parameters, training methodology and operational rules established by Thaler. The Office consequently held that “autonomy in execution is not synonymous with conception of a work.”

The Office noted that Aalmuhammed v. Lee[xv] described the relevant person as the “effective cause” or “mastermind” to whom the work ultimately owes its origin.  The Registrar, however, made clear that such expressions were merely descriptive aids; the controlling test remains who is the person who “caused the work to be created”.

This finding created an unusual consequence for the application. The Office had concluded that Thaler was the person who caused the particular work to be created, yet the application continued to identify DABUS as the author and Thaler as the owner. That position raised a separate issue under Sections 17–19. Section 17[xvi] lays down the general rule that “the author of a work shall be the first owner of the copyright therein” and Section 18[xvii] and 19[xviii] provide for assignment of copyright. Applying this framework to the application as presented, the Copyright Office held that the claim that DABUS was the author while Dr. Thaler was the owner could not be reconciled with Sections 17-19. If DABUS were treated as the author, the applicant would have to establish either a statutory exception under Section 17, vesting first ownership directly in Dr. Thaler, or a valid transfer under Sections 18 and 19. The Copyright Office found that neither had been established[xix].

The Delhi High Court heard the matter on 18th September 2026 and granted two weeks for filling a rejoinder. Meanwhile, the Copyright Office’s order dated 31 August 2026 rejecting the copyright application remains operative. The office concluded the proceeding by holding that extending legal person-hood or authorship to AI would be a matter of Parliament rather than an administrative reinterpretation of the existing statute.

Conclusion

The DABUS proceedings show that the main legal issue is not simply whether AI can generate an original work, but who the law recognizes as its author. While the UK Supreme Court held that the ownership of AI system did not confer patent rights and that DABUS could not be an inventor, South Africa granted DABUS its first patent under formalities examination. The Indian Copyright Office adopted a unique approach under Section 2(d)(vi). The office identifies Thaler as the person who caused its original creation, but rejected the application because DABUS continued to be claimed as the author. For now, extending legal person-hood or authorship to AI remains a matter for Parliament.

[i] The Copyright Act, No. 14 of 1957.

[ii] AI generated art can get copyright, but AI can’t be recognized as author- Copyright office (https://theprint.in/judiciary/ai-generated-art-covered-by-indias-copyright-law-delhi-hc-gives-copyright-office-8-weeks-to-decide/2901029/).

[iii] The Patents Act, § 13 (UK).  

[iv] Rule 10(3), The Patents Rules, 2007 (UK).

[v] The Patents Act, § 7 (UK).

[vi] Thaler v. Comptroller General of Patents, Design and Trade Marks, [2020] UKSC 49.

[vii] The Patents Act, § 7(3) (UK). 

[viii] The Patents Act, § 7(2)(b) (UK).  

[ix] The Copyright Act, § 13(1)(a).

[x] University of London Press Ltd. v. University Tutorial Press Ltd, (1916) 2 Ch. 601.

[xi] Eastern Book Co. v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1.

[xii] Authorship of AI: Legislative Prerogative, DABUS & Copyright Office, (Sept. 1, 2026), https://www.scconline.com/blog/post/2026/09/01/authorship-of-ai-legislative-prerogative-dabus-copyright-office/

[xiii] Id.

[xiv] The Copyright Act, § 2(d)(vi).

[xv] Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227 (9 Cir. 2000).

[xvi] The Copyright Act, § 17.

[xvii] The Copyright Act, § 18.

[xviii] The Copyright Act, § 19.

[xix] Supra 12.