The notion of formal recognition within the international system is viewed as a formal acknowledgement for an entity to qualify as a state. Sudan and Palestine demonstrate contrasting dimensions of the recognition politics. Sudan is fully recognised as a sovereign state, and the state recognition remains largely unaffected despite extensive documentation of atrocities in the ongoing conflict.^[i] In contrast, Palestine is recognised by over 150 states and affirmed by the UN General Assembly as a Non-member observer State in 2012 (UNGA Resolution 67/19); however, it lacks complete membership and faces structural obstacles to receiving institutional recognition. The recognition of statehood has been derived from two theories: declaratory theory, where an entity becomes a state once it qualifies laid-down criteria such as territory, population, government, and, conversely, constitutive theory, which relies on other states to confer recognition to an entity.

 Recognition Amid the Genocide in Sudan

Since April 2023, Sudan has witnessed a brutal civil war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF)  and theRapid Support Forces (RSF). The Rapid Support Forces are paramilitary groups capitalising on the chaos of an unstable government in Sudan after the fallout of Omar al-Bashir. RSF has been accused of carrying out genocide and ethnic cleansing in the Darfur region of Sudan. Such accusations have been supported by the claims of the United States of America and multiple human rights organisations across the world. However, the Trump Administration seems to take a more neutral stance than the Biden Administration; the Trump Administration refuses to expand on Biden’s declaration of RSF committing genocide in Sudan. Multiple reports claim widespread sexual atrocities, mass exodus and annihilation of village settlements. According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Operational Data Portal, the war has forcibly displaced over 12 million people. Amnesty International reports that RSF soldiers regularly gang-rape girls and women in front of their families, abducting them for sexual slavery. Over 221 children have been raped in Sudan since 2024. Despite the humanitarian crisis, the Sudanese State continues to enjoy formal recognition. The representatives continue to participate in the multilateral bodies, embassies continue to operate, and the leaders are able to cultivate favour with the support of foreign powers, especially from the Gulf.

The United Arab Emirates has been channelling weaponry, financial and logistical support to RSF through shadow transit routes and airlifting. Emirati Passports, bombs, and military hardware have been discovered in RSF-controlled Sudan, indicating Abu Dhabi intends to capitalise on the growing instability in Sudan. Amnesty International and  Human Rights Watch have reported the use of newly imported weapons and ammunition.^[ii] Along with that, the journalists have traced the arteries of gold and finance that perpetuate the conflict. The Sudanese Government has been able to file a case in the International Court of Justice against the UAE for violating the Genocide Convention by aiding the RSF. ^[iii] However, the ICJ has dismissed the request for provisional measures on the grounds that neither vindicates the UAE nor halts the ongoing genocide.

The UAE has been accused of providing logistical and material support to the RSF, continues to participate in multilateral diplomacy without any constraints, endorses defence and technology agreements with Western countries, and host major global summits such as COP28.^[iv] The external factors treat both the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF)  as dialogue partners in the ceasefire negotiations. ^[v]

Denial of Recognition Amid Genocide in Palestine

The recognition of Palestine has been formally affirmed by the United Nations General Assembly, and the same has been supported and recognised by more than 140 states. The International Court of Justice has constantly upheld the Palestinians’ right to self-determination. Despite this, Palestine does not receive comprehensive institutional recognition; its status has often been dismissed by Western powers under the pretext of a ‘complex political issue’ rather than a matter of law. The full membership in the UN is denied, and it is further excluded from various international institutions.  The Palestinian occupation thrives in the prolonged Israeli occupation; the key aspects of life, such as movements, access to resources, and territorial governance, are controlled by the occupying power that exercises its effective control over the region.

The genocidal campaign in Gaza exposes the structural hypocrisy rooted in the framework of statehood and recognition. The International Court of Justice in the 26th January 2024 order on Provisional Measures held that “atleast some of the acts alleged by South Africa to have been committed by Israel in Gaza appear to be capable of falling within the provisions of the [Genocide] Convention”. The Court further held that the situation in Gaza presents “plausible risk of irreparable prejudice”. The court further directed Israel to “take all measures within its power to prevent the commission of all acts within the scope of Article II  of the Genocide Convention”, including “killing members of the group”, “causing serious bodily or mental harm”, and “deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about the group’s physical destruction in whole or in part”.  Despite such claims, Israel continues to act as a legitimate state actor on International forums, whereas Palestine, despite widespread recognition and ‘observer status’ at the UN, remains excluded from full membership in the UN and is required to justify its claim for full recognition.

Geopolitical Parameters of Recognition in International Law

The structure of recognition has been embedded in two doctrinal theories. Declaratory theory, where an entity becomes a state once it qualifies laid-down criteria such as territory, population, and government, in contrast lies constitutive theory, which relies on other states to confer recognition to an entity. However, scholarly literature argues that neither theory fully captures how recognition actually operates in practice. It has been argued that recognition is heavily influenced by geopolitical interests, political considerations, and strategic alignment.

The conflict in Sudan demonstrates a different dynamic apart from the two theories. Sudan is a fully recognised sovereign state, and the internal conflicts do not challenge the legality of recognition. However, the case of Sudan demonstrates how political considerations and economic interests shape international responses to the atrocities, including selective condemnation. The UAE, which has been accused of providing material support to RSF, continues to maintain strong diplomatic ties and participate in multilateral forums.^[vi] This reflects how a state which strategic and economic value can avoid meaningful accountability.

In contrast, Palestine reflects a canonical example of recognition politics. Palestine has been officially recognised by over 150 states and affirmed by the UN General Assembly by being accorded a Non-Member Observer State; however lacks complete admission to the United Nations to which requires approval by the Security Council, in which the United States has often exercised its veto powers. Despite fulfilling the criteria according to the declaratory theory, Palestine has been prevented from having institutional authority in the UN due to structural geopolitical opposition, particularly from Western Powers aligned with Israel. ^[vii]

The Doctrine of Recognition from Decolonisation to Contemporary Practice

Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) scholars  argue that international legal forms often stage political choices as neutral legal process. They further argue that recognition is embedded in the regulations of powerful states in the international system. The Montevideo criteria emphasises over elements which are needed to be fulfilled to get recognition; however, they do not guarantee institutional effect. An entity may clear the Montavideo criteria and yet can be excluded from full institutional participation. This reflects the fact that doctrinally deemed ‘fit’ may have different institutional consequences.

The conferral of recognition to an entity broadly correlates with material interests, such as strategic alliances, economic ties and regional influence. TWAIL and other critiques have documented how imperial nations use legal formalities to gain geopolitical advantage. Furthermore, the Western Sahara case exemplifies this: the powerful imperial nations continue to treat Morocco’s occupation as legitimate, though the UN has already recognised the Sahrawi people’s right to self-determination, the response of Western countries has been heavily derived from strategic partnerships, arms trade and counterterrorism cooperation.^[viii] The US recognised Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara in exchange for diplomatic concessions to Israel in 2020; this is a classic example of recognition used as a geopolitical currency.^[ix]

Conclusion

The contemporary practice of recognition politics illustrates the fact that the doctrines act as an instrument designed by global power hierarchies rather than operating as a neutral legal mechanism. Human rights norms are inconsistently applied when they clash with the geopolitical and economic interests of imperial nations. The scholars from Global South shall interrogate the dynamics and expose structural biases embedded within international legal course, they should further analyse how geopolitical interests, economic ties, strategic geography shape the behavior of state, overshadowing the legal criteria.

Future research should:

1. Examine the political-economic determinants of recognition through comparative case studies.
2. Analyse how recognition faces institutional barriers through veto politics in the UN Security Council.
3. Investigate how regional occupations, such as ASEAN, EU, AU either counterbalance or reproduce dominant recognition practices.

Endnotes

^[i] Amnesty Int’l, “Death Came to Our Home”: War Crimes in Sudan (2024); Human Rights Watch, Sudan: Ethnic Cleansing in Darfur (2023); U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Operational Data Portal: Sudan Situation, https://data.unhcr.org

^[ii] Amnesty Int’l, Sudan: Advanced Chinese Weaponry Provided by UAE Idhostsentified in Breach of Arms Embargo – New Investigation (May 7, 2025), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2025/05/sudan-advanced-chinese-hostsendorsesweaponry-provided-by-uae-identified-in-breach-of-arms-embargo-new-investigation/

^[iii] Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Sudan v. United Arab Emirates), ICJ General List No. 197 (filed 5 May 2025), https://www.icj-cij.org/case/197

^[iv] Chris Wright, US, UAE Agree to Establish Major Defense Partnership, Al Arabiya English (May 19, 2025), https://english.alarabiya.net/News/middle-east/2025/05/19/us-uae-agree-to-establish-major-defense-partnership-.

^[v] Amb. Donald E. Booth & Amb. Nureldin Satti, Sudan’s Ceasefire Talks: What Has Been Missing Thus Far?, Wilson Ctr. (Oct. 31, 2024), https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/sudans-ceasefire-talks-what-has-been-missing-thus-far

^[vi] Mark Townsend, “‘Smoking gun’ evidence points to UAE involvement in Sudan civil war,” The Guardian (Jul. 25, 2024), https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/article/2024/jul/25/smoking-gun-evidence-points-to-uae-involvement-in-sudan-civil-wa a emphasisthat neede

^[vii] Emma Farge, U.N. Experts Censure Western Support for Israel Since Gaza War, Reuters (Sept. 16, 2024), https://www.reuters.com/world/un-experts-censure-western-supporthave powerful a -israel-since-gaza-war-2024-09-16emphasisthat need;a  that needem;hasisee

^[viii] Human Rights Watch, World Report 2025: Morocco and Western Sahara (2025), https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2025/country-chapters/morocco-and-western-sahara.

^[ix] Al Jazeera, Israel, Morocco agree to normalise relations in US-brokered deal, Al Jazeera (Dec. 10, 2020), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/12/10/israel-morocco-agree-to-normalise-relations-in-us-brokered-deal.