On 2 September 2025, the bail petition for the nine accused in the 2020 Northeast Delhi “larger conspiracy” case under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) was presented before a Division bench of the Delhi High Court and subsequently denied by the Bench. Reviewing the 133-page ruling records, the Bench undermined the right to protest and refused the parity with the earlier grants of bail awarded to 3 student activists in 2021^[1]. In the coeval orders, the High Court expounded, at considerable length, upon the test enunciated by the Supreme Court in NIA vs Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali^[2] case for the application of Section 43D (5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, which embodies the restrictive bail conditions.

A large part of the legal fraternity and the civil rights activists observe that these rulings resonate with the echoes of the ADM Jabalpur v. Shivakant Shukla (1976)^[3]One of the most discussed judgments, infamously known as the “Habeas Corpus Case”, where the majority of a Supreme Court bench upheld the executive power during the emergency and maneuvered the detentions from judicial scrutiny. The article would map the similarities and the important differences between the Delhi High Court’s 2025 ruling and the ADM Jabalpur, and beseech the meaning of liberty in an age of expansive national security legislation.

Restrictive Bail under UAPA: The Watali Standard 

Section 43D (5) lays down the requirements for the Court to refuse bail if, on perusal of the police report or the case diary, there are reasonable grounds for perceiving the accusations are prima facie true. This shifted the bail-granting horizon of the Court away from the ordinary principles in favour of the prosecution. The provision made bail difficult to secure, since it required the Court to assess guilt only by looking at the charge sheet prepared by the National Investigation Agency (NIA). The accused cannot provide any evidence outside the chargesheet in their defense^[4].

In the case of NIA vs Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali,^[5] the Supreme Court fixed this inclination: during the bail stage, courts must avoid a detailed perusal of evidence, may take the prosecution’s submissions as they are, and should consider the findings on “broad plausibilities” pertinent to the accused’s involvement. The judgment of the case advises the courts not to take into consideration the admissibility at this stage and to account for the entirety of the submissions, not on a detailed perusal.

The September order of the Delhi High Court largely aligns with this framework. Setting out eight watali-based propositions almost as a checklist for rejecting bail under 43D (5).

The ADM Jabalpur case: What it did and what later overruled it:

During the 1975-1977 period, when the National Emergency was proclaimed, the ADM Jabalpur order upheld the suspension of Articles 14,21, and 22; courts were kept aside from entertaining the habeas corpus petitions to question the legality of detentions. The majority of the bench thus advocated the abdication of the habeas corpus review; Justice H.R. Khanna’s loud dissent promulgated that the matters of life and liberty are not the gift of law (State).

After more than 40 years, a nine-judge bench of the Supreme Court in the Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Right to Privacy)^[6] case explicitly overruled the ADM Jabalpur judgment, calling its majority “seriously flawed” and reaffirming that life and personal liberty are inalienable and not a gift or conferment of the State.^[7]

Where the reverberations remain: 

1. Bowing to the State’s Security Narrative: Like ADM Jabalpur, where the Court retreated from examining the constitutionality of executive detention under the pretext of national emergency. The Watali and Section 43D (5) instruct the courts to acknowledge the prosecution’s submission at face value and to avoid probing the admissibility and pertinency. The Delhi High Court’s 2025 orders reflect the strict following of this framework: the documents of the prosecution should be taken into account, as it is, and only broad possibilities should be recorded; the position of the framework diminishes the scope of judicial scrutiny at the pre-trial stage.
2. The diminishing protective valve of liberty: Habeas corpus in the ADM Jabalpur case and the bail provisions under the UAPA show a common objective: indefinite detention without reasonable judicial scrutiny of the state. In North-East Delhi, “larger conspiracy case” trials have been sinisterly slow- five years on, arguments of the charge have not concluded on some matters involving hundreds of witnesses. The High Court has previously raised voices against the long incarceration, yet the September 2025 dismissal of bail to the accused, who has been in jail for the last 5 years, while the trial horizon remains dormant. The structural risk is evident: liberty stands compromised by procedural delay, compounded by the application of a deferential standard.”^[8]
3. Framing dissent as disorder: The September ruling of the court expresses the constrained views of the court on determining the threshold of dissent to constitute disorder, and the alleged “larger conspiracy” case. The political speeches, assemblies, and dissents are effectively seen through a security lens. While this position resonates with the absolutism witnessed during the emergency era, viewing political speeches and dissents as a threat to national security, and then imposing a deferential bail standards, echoes the rationale that was used to justify the executive detention during that period.^[9]

 Drawing the Line in Analogy:

1. No formal suspension of rights: Unlike 1976, India is not under a national emergency where fundamental rights have been justifiably disabled; the current constitutional landscape does not entail any suspension of the fundamental rights, all the constitutional safeguards and liberties are legally intact and enforceable in the court of law. The September orders of the High Court are a reasoned judicial decision crafted within the limits of statutory boundaries. They are subjected to further review by the higher appellate bodies, including the Supreme Court. This position of the landscape exposes the glaring difference between the jurisprudence during the emergency era and the present judicial approach.  
2. Watali’s Framework and the Residual Protections of Liberty: The September order of the Delhi High Court is not a product of creative jurisprudence; it is confined to adhering to the provisions of Section 43D(5) UAPA, interpreted through the conduit of NIA v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali, at the same time, the Supreme Court of India in Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb (2021)^[10] acknowledged the extreme conditions such as prolonged incarceration, and significant trial delay can be taken into consideration for granting bail even under stringent bail conditions provided under Section 43D(5), endorsing the primacy of Article 21 to safeguard personal liberty. This evolving trend of jurisprudence corroborates the claim that the legal system holds the liberty-protective mechanism. These examples demonstrate that the liberty-protective tools of present-day jurisprudence have gradually evolved, and it was conspicuously absent in the ADM Jabalpur era.

The Constitutional Stakes: 

Despite the significant distinctions from the emergency era, the practical consequences of the courts’ approach of combining Section 43D(5), Watali’s interpretation, and protracted mega-trials while granting bail under UAPA result in prolonged pre-trial incarceration, mostly based on the fact that the courts are entitled to very little ambit to scrutinize the matter. The approach underscores why Puttaswamy’s judgment of repudiating the ADM Jabalpur ruling is so significant: it restores the culture of justification and sets up a precedent to acquire a reasonable, justifiable, and constitutional way while dealing with matters pertinent to the life and liberty of an individual, rather than following the traditional statutory conduit to defy the claims of liberty.

In view of the Puttaswamy judgment, reading the September order of the Delhi High Court cannot substantiate the saying that it is a literal revival of the ADM Jabalpur case. Yet, the order resonates with its deference, as liberty is apparently sidelined by the court at this stage, meant to safeguard against the executive overreach and systematic delay. These rulings have highlighted the persistent tension between the practical presumption of the extended pre-trial detention under UAPA and the Supreme Court’s repeated affirmation that Article 21 demarcates a concrete ceiling on the length of time to detain an accused while prosecution readies its case. The most recent affirmation was observed in the Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb case.

What a Rights-Compatible approach could look like:

Firstly, the trial courts and the High Courts could directly invoke the rulings laid down by the Supreme Court in the K.A. Najeeb case when dealing with the UAPA cases where a trial had not been started, evidence recording had barely begun, especially in over-extensive prosecutions involving hundreds of witnesses. This approach would not necessarily undermine the principle laid down in the Watali case, but the focus would shift from the evidentiary sufficiency to applying the proportionality test. Asking whether prolonged incarceration of the accused would amount to the undermining of personal liberty.^[11]

Secondly, the High Court could more effectively enforce the requirement “that prima facie” true under Section 43D (5) necessitates establishing an apparent individualized nexus between each of the accused and the specific offences that are alleged. This framework could work as a safeguard against the sweeping accusation of guilt merely based on ideological similarity, physical presence, and association in the protest spaces. This approach would concur with the statutory provisions and would simultaneously demonstrate the difference between dissent and provocation of disorder.

Lastly, the structural reforms are indispensable. Courts must enforce trial timelines, ensuring that the personal liberty of the accused under the UAPA should not be undermined unjustifiably. The courts should adopt alternatives to incarcerating the accused, such as stringent reporting requirements, geographical restraints, or electronic monitoring. Taken together, such reforms would directly address the structural risk that the Watali standard, when compounded by chronic delays, transforms pre-trial custody into a punishment in everything but name.”

Conclusion:

The ADM Jabalpur case had highlighted how swiftly the Courts could surrender the liberty to the executive, invoking the rhetoric of “necessary”. In contrast, the K.S. Puttaswamy judgment subverted that legacy and reaffirmed the primacy of personal liberty as an inalienable right. The Delhi High Court’s September 2025 bail denials don’t literally bring ADM Jabalpur back from the past. But by relying on a highly deferential bail standard under the UAPA, and setting it against the backdrop of endlessly delayed trials, they echo its troubling logic. The risk today is not that rights are openly suspended, but that they quietly shrink, eroded bit by bit through slow processes and courts giving too much ground to the State.

What really matters, moving forward, is whether courts stay true to the spirit of Puttaswamy. That means insisting that even the most extraordinary laws respect the promise of Article 21: that freedom comes first, detention before trial is the rare exception, and no one’s liberty is treated as punishment before guilt is proven.^[12]

[1] Northeast Delhi riots: Tasleem Ahmed’s bail plea rejected by HC. (2025, September 2). The Times of India – Delhi. Retrieved from the Times of India website. website.https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/delhi/delhi-high-court-rejects-bail-of-tasleem-ahmed-accused-in-2020-ne-delhi-riots-case/articleshow/123653106.cms

[2] NIA v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali, (2019) 5 SCC 1.

[3] Additional District Magistrate, Jabalpur v. Shivakant Shukla, (1976) 2 SCC 521.

[4] Chandrachud, D. Y. (2021, October). Right to Privacy: Puttaswamy Judgment – Justice Chandrachud J. Supreme Court Observer. Retrieved from https://www.scobserver.in/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/1-266Right_to_Privacy__Puttaswamy_Judgment-Chandrachud.pdf

[5] NIA v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali, (2019) 5 SCC 1.

[6] Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) vs. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1

[7] Chandrachud, D. Y. (2021, October). Right to Privacy: Puttaswamy Judgment – Justice Chandrachud J. Supreme Court Observer. Retrieved from https://www.scobserver.in/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/1-266Right_to_Privacy__Puttaswamy_Judgment-Chandrachud.pdf

[8] Times News Network. (2025, July 9). HC questions prolonged detention in NE riots case. The Times of India. Retrieved from https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/delhi/hc-questions-prolonged-detention-in-ne-riots-case/articleshow/122326423.cms

[9] Times News Network. (2025, September 2). Delhi High Court rejects bail of Tasleem Ahmed accused in 2020 NE Delhi riots case. The Times of India. Retrieved from https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/delhi/delhi-high-court-rejects-bail-of-tasleem-ahmed-accused-in-2020-ne-delhi-riots-case/articleshow/123653106.cms

[10] Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb (2021),(2021) 3 SCC 713

[11] Times News Network. (2025, July 9). HC questions prolonged detention in NE riots case. The Times of India. Retrieved from https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/delhi/hc-questions-prolonged-detention-in-ne-riots-case/articleshow/122326423.cms

[12] Supreme Court Observer. (2021, October 5). Bail under UAPA: Court in review. Supreme Court Observer. https://www.scobserver.in/journal/bail-under-uapa-court-in-review/