On 29 January 2026, the Supreme Court of India passed an interim stay order in relation to the University Grants Commission (Guidelines for Higher Education Institutions), 2026, which had been issued on 13 January 2026 in substitution of the earlier UGC Guidelines, 2012 governing higher educational institutions. The 2026 Guidelines, owing to their immediate applicability and wide regulatory impact on universities, students, and academic administration, raised concerns regarding clarity, scope, and enforceability, and were challenged before the Court on multiple grounds, including the potential for caste-based discrimination within higher education institutions.
In its interim order, the Supreme Court examined the Petitioners’ principal contention that Clause 3(c), defining “caste-based discrimination,” is restrictive and exclusionary, leaving individuals belonging to non-reserved or general categories without any remedy, even when they face discrimination or institutional bias. The Petitioners argued that the Guidelines rest on the unfounded presumption that caste-based discrimination operates solely against reserved categories.
Upon prima facie consideration, the Court observed that certain provisions of the 2026 Guidelines appeared ambiguous and could potentially be misused. It identified substantial questions of law requiring detailed examination:
1.Whether Clause 3(c) bears a reasonable nexus to the objectives of the 2026 Guidelines, particularly in light of the absence of a distinct procedural mechanism for caste-based discrimination compared to the broader definition under Clause 3(e).
2.Whether operationalizing “caste-based discrimination” would affect the constitutional and statutory classification of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, and Other Backward Classes, and whether the Guidelines provide adequate safeguards for Extremely Backward Castes.
3.Whether the term “segregation” in Clause 7(d), concerning allocation of hostels, classrooms, or mentorship groups, could amount to a “separate yet equal” classification, potentially infringing Articles 14 and 15, and the Preamble.
4.Whether omitting “ragging” as a specific form of discrimination, despite its recognition in the 2012 Regulations, constitutes a regressive legislative omission, undermining equality and access to justice under Articles 14 and 21.
5.Any ancillary questions arising during the proceedings that may warrant Court intervention.
While refraining from a final determination, the Court stayed the operation of the 2026 Guidelines and, in exercise of its powers under Article 142, directed that the UGC Guidelines, 2012 continue to govern the field until further orders, preserving the status quo and ensuring protection against caste-based discrimination pending detailed judicial scrutiny.
The prima facie observations in the interim stay order, however, cannot be fully appreciated without examining them against the Supreme Court’s established constitutional understanding of equality and caste-based discrimination.
A meaningful engagement with the stay order therefore requires reference to the landmark decision in State of Kerala v. N.M. Thomas (1976)[i], the Court articulated the doctrine of substantive equality under Articles 14 and 16, rejecting a purely formal conception of equality. The Court recognised that caste-based discrimination is structural and historically entrenched, warranting differential treatment to achieve real equality. Equality, it held, lies not in uniform treatment but in addressing unequal social realities through context-sensitive measures.
When viewed through this lens, the Supreme Court’s emphasis in the UGC stay order on the symmetrical operation of caste-based discrimination appears to mark a departure from this settled position. By questioning the assumption that discrimination may operate unidirectionally, the reasoning risks reducing caste to an abstract and neutral category, thereby diluting its structural and historical dimensions.
This tension is further reflected in Sukanya Shantha v. Union of India (2024)[ii], where the Supreme Court acknowledged the continued discrimination faced by denotified and nomadic tribes within institutional settings. The Court recognised that historical stigma persists even after formal denotification and that caste-based disadvantage may operate without explicit intent. When contrasted with the hesitation in the UGC stay order to accept an asymmetrical understanding of caste discrimination in higher education, an internal inconsistency in judicial reasoning becomes evident.
A similar contrast emerges from Ashok Kumar Gupta v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1997)[iii], where the Supreme Court upheld reservation in promotion for SC/ST categories and rejected objections based on merit and efficiency. The Court proceeded on the understanding that such standards are shaped by historical privilege and cannot be treated as neutral grounds to deny substantive equality. The stay order on the UGC Equity Guidelines, however, adopts a different emphasis by underscoring the need for remedial access for unreserved categories, thereby questioning the unidirectional framing of discrimination.
In K.C. Vasanth Kumar v. State of Karnataka(1985)[iv], particularly in Justice Chinnappa Reddy’s concurring opinion, the Supreme Court cautioned against abstract claims of merit and efficiency, observing that such arguments often reflect the perspectives of the privileged and perpetuate historical exclusion. The Court treated caste discrimination as structurally asymmetrical and justified targeted protective measures on that basis. The assumption underlying the UGC stay order that discrimination is not unidirectional and that remedial mechanisms must therefore operate symmetrically stands in tension with this earlier critique of neutrality and merit.
Taken together, these decisions demonstrate that the Supreme Court has, at different moments, articulated divergent constitutional approaches to caste discrimination oscillating between a structural, asymmetrical understanding grounded in substantive equality and a more symmetrical, formal conception of equality. The interim stay on the UGC Guidelines brings this unresolved tension within the Court’s jurisprudence into sharp focus, raising critical questions about the contemporary direction of constitutional protection against caste-based discrimination.
[i] State of Kerala v. N.M. Thomas, (1976) 2 SCC 310 : AIR 1976 SC 490.
[ii] Sukanya Shantha v. Union of India, 2024 INSC 753; AIR 2024 SC 5201.
[iii] Ashok Kumar Gupta v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1997) 5 SCC 201; AIR 1997 SC 250.
[iv] K.C. Vasanth Kumar v. State of Karnataka, (1985) 1 SCC 714; AIR 1985 SC 1495.

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